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UNESCO'S PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Philip Alston*
INTRODUCTION

The introduction by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1978 of a new
procedure' for responding to violations of human rights has
been praised as "one of the organization's major achievements" and as being "exemplary within the system of international organizations." '2 Decision 3.3 was adopted by consensus
by the UNESCO Executive Board, following an extensive examination of the procedures used by other international organizations and of the existing UNESCO procedure for the consideration of communications." Under the procedure,
individuals, groups, non-governmental organizations, and possibly states, are entitled to petition UNESCO concerning alleged violations of certain human rights, provided that the authors of these communications are either themselves the
victims of the violations or consider that they have reliable
knowledge thereof. The procedure applies both to "cases,"
which concern individual and specific violations of human
rights, and to "questions," which involve massive, systematic,
or flagrant violations of human rights committed de jure or de
facto by a state, or resulting from an accumulation of individual cases forming a consistent pattern.
The UNESCO procedure is of particular interest because
it seeks to remedy some of the shortcomings which have
o 1980 by Philip Alston
* LL. M., University of Melbourne; J.S.D., University of California School of
Law, Berkeley. This article was prepared in connection with the research program of
the Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, London, England.
1. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, 104 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 104 EX/
Decision (1978). See app. A infra.
2. UNESCO Executive Board member, Mr. Fabricius, in 105 UNESCO Executive Board 205, UNESCO Doc. 105 EX/SR.23, para. 10.5 (1978).

3. The term "communications" is an euphemism for "complaints".
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caused comparable procedures within the United Nations4 to
be relatively ineffective to date. This article briefly notes the
broader role of UNESCO in the promotion and protection of
human rights, examines in some detail the new communications procedure and the way in which it might operate, and
draws conclusions as to the problems associated with the procedure and its prospects for success.
UNESCO AND HUMAN RIGHTS5
UNESCO's human rights mandate is clearly and unequivocally stated in the first article of its Constitution, adopted in
1945. That article provides that the purpose of the organization is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and
culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the
rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world

. . .

by

the Charter of the United Nations."6 One of the organization's
earliest activities was to undertake a survey7 of the views of
leading intellectuals and activists of the day with regard to
the philosophical and theoretical issues involved in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.8 On December 11, 1948, the day following the General Assembly's
adoption of the Universal Declaration, the General Conference of UNESCO instructed the Director-General to stimulate
the dissemination of information about the Declaration, to encourage its use in schools, and "to direct his programme sections to employ the Declaration where ever possible in their
programme activities." 9 In 1950, the General Conference re4. See, e.g., Economic and Social Council resolutions 728 F, 28 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. (No.1) 18, 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959); 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1)
17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967); 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/
4832/Add.1 (1970).
5. For a detailed examination see Marks, UNESCO and Human Rights: The
Implementation of Rights Relating to Education, Science, Culture,and Communication, 13 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 35 (1977).
6. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (1947).
7. The survey was published in HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO ed. 1949).
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed Dec. 10, 1948, adopted
by G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
9. UNESCO Res. 8.1, 3 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 34, UNESCO Doc. 3 C/Resolutions (1948).
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solved "to initiate an intensive campaign with a view to providing a better understanding of human rights and of the part
played by them in society and in the relations between
peoples."10
During the 1950's and early 1960's, UNESCO played a
prominent role in the drafting of the International Covenants
on Human Rights. 1 It succeeded in having relatively detailed
provisions relating to the specific rights with which it was concerned included in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.1 2 It was also successful, as were
the other major UN specialized agencies in their respective
spheres of interest, in ensuring that the implementation procedures incorporated in that Covenant served to reinforce
UNESCO's role as the "guardian" of rights relating to education, science, culture, and information.' 3
Virtually every session of the UNESCO General Conference has adopted a number of resolutions relating to the
human rights activities of the organization."' Thus, for example, it declared at its eighteenth session that "the defence and
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and
the struggle against incitement to war, colonialism, neocolonialism, racialism, apartheid and all other forms of oppression and discrimination are an essential duty for
UNESCO." 5 The organization's Medium-Term Plan (19771982) contains an eloquent and specific dedication to the pro10. UNESCO Res. 9.212, 5 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 62, UNESCO Doc. 5 C/
Resolutions (1950).
11. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). [hereinafter cited
as CESCR & CCPR respectively].
12. See Alston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1979).
13. Id.
14. A comprehensive descriptive survey of relevant UNESCO resolutions was
submitted to the International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968.
See Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/10 (1968). For a more recent survey see Report of the DirectorGeneral, UNESCO'S Contribution to Peace and its Tasks with Respect to the Promotion of Human Rights and the Elimination of Colonialism and Racialism, UNESCO
Doc. 20 C/14 (1978).
15. UNESCO Res. 9.1, UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 93, UNESCO Doc. 18 C/Resolutions (1974); see generally 102 UNESCO Executive Board 57-59, UNESCO Doc.
102 EX/19, paras. 127-30 (1977).
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motion and protection of human rights, tasks which are said
to be "at the basis of the great purposes by which mankind is
motivated at this point in history; it gives them their significance, sets their trends and likewise imposes certain criteria
for the action to which they give rise.''16

In its human rights endeavors, UNESCO has frequently
resorted to the mechanism perfected by the International Labor Organization (ILO): the setting of international standards
in the form of conventions and recommendations." Notable
among these are: the Convention' 8 and the Recommendation' 9
Against Discrimination in Education; the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage; 20 the Recommendation Concerning Education for
International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;2 ' and the Recommendation on Participation by the
People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to
2
It.

The organization has also adopted several Declarations

which are of particular significance in human rights terms, including the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation 2' and the Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice. 2' But the most significant facet of UNESCO's recent human rights activities is, in many respects, the extent to
which concern for the promotion of human rights is reflected
in a number of areas of the organization's overall program, as
16. 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. 2, UNESCO Doc. 19 C/4, para. 107 (1977).
17. See UNESCO Doc. 20 C/22 and Annex (1978) entitled "The Organization's
Normative Action: Proposals and Report by the Director-General and the Executive
Board".
18. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, by
the General Conference of UNESCO. 11 UNESCO Gen. Conf. 476-81, UNESCO Doc.
11 C/Proceedings (1960), 429 U.N.T.S. 93.
19. Recommendation Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14,
1960, by the General Conference of UNESCO. Id.
20. Adopted Nov. 16, 1972, by the General Conference of UNESCO. 17
UNESCO Gen. Conf. 135, UNESCO Doc. 17 C/Resolutions (1972).
21. Adopted Nov. 19, 1974, by the General Conference of UNESCO. 18
UNESCO Gen. Conf. 147, UNESCO Doc. 18 C/Resolutions (1974).
22. Adopted Nov. 16, 1976, by the General Conference of UNESCO. 19
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Annex I 29, UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Resolutions (1976).
23. Proclaimed Nov. 4, 1966, by the General Conference of UNESCO. 14
UNESCO Gen. Conf. 86, UNESCO Doc. 14 C/Resolutions (1966).
24. Proclaimed Nov. 27, 1978, by the General Conference of UNESCO. 20
UNESCO Gen. Conf. 61, UNESCO Doc. 14 C/Resolutions (1978).
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attested by its Medium-Term Plan for the period 1977-1982.25
Viewed from this perspective, UNESCO's procedure for dealing with human rights violations is only one, albeit important,
facet of the organization's human rights work.
RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS

The focus of this article is the method chosen by
UNESCO to respond to alleged violations of human rights. It
does not, however, deal with the several mechanisms which
the organization has established for dealing with complaints
between states relating to human rights matters.28
Ever since their establishment, both the United Nations
itself and certain of its specialized agencies have received
communications from individuals and groups alleging violations of human rights. Such communications are usually sent
with the expectation that each organization will seek to terminate violations wherever they exist. In practice, such expectations have been disappointed in the vast majority of cases. Of
all the constitutions of the specialized agencies, only the ILO's
provides for a specific procedure for dealing with communications.2 7 The UNESCO Constitution contains no similar provision. However, before tracing the evolution of UNESCO's procedures it is appropriate to briefly note the disappointing
policy response of the UN's human rights organs to the question of communications.
For twenty years, until 1967, the official and oft-repeated
position of the UN was that the Commission on Human
Rights had "no power to take any action in regard to any
complaints concerning human rights." The genesis of this doctrine was a statement to that effect in the 1947 report of a
Sub-Committee on the Handling of Communications which
the Commission had established.2 8 The statement was subse25. 19 UNESCO GEN. CONF. 1, UNESCO Doc. 19 C/4 (1977).
26. These are described in 102 UNESCO Executive Board 47-51, UNESCO
DOC. 102 EX/19 (1977).
27. Article 24 of the ILO Constitution provides that an association of employers
or workers may make a representation to the ILO Director-General against a State

Party to an ILO Convention which the applicant considers has failed to secure the
effective observance of the Convention. See 2 A. PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNORGANIZATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
1230, 1247 (2d ed. 1961);
Landy, The Implementation Procedure of the InternationalLabor Organization, 20
SANTA CLARA L. R. 633 (1980).
28. Report of the Sub-Committee on the Handling of Communications U.N.
MENTAL

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

quently endorsed by both the Commission itself" and, in August 1947, by the Economic and Social Council.3 0 The resolution of the latter established a procedure whereby the
Secretary-General was requested to compile, before each session of the Human Rights Commission, a confidential list of
communications with no more than a general indication of
their substance. The list was then formally noted by the Commission, and no further action was taken. Although early
drafts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' including that prepared by the UN Secretariat in 1947,32 had
included the right of petition, that provision was deleted by
the Commission's drafting Committee and did not appear in
the Declaration as adopted by the General Assembly in December 1948.
The appropriateness of the 1947 doctrine was effectively
called into question by the Secretariat itself in 1949,13 and in
the following year the doctrine was roundly condemned by a
leading authority on international law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht3 4 It is against this background that the Executive
Board of UNESCO first considered the question of how it
might respond to communications.
The solution it adopted was similar to that of the UN and
was equally unsatisfactory. In 1952, the Board acknowledged
that the organization was receiving communications from both
individuals and non-governmental organizations alleging
human rights violations by both member and non-member
states of UNESCO. 5 While noting that "no cognizance" could
be taken of such communications, 6 the Board established at
its next meeting an embryonic procedure that came closer to
Doc. E/CN.4/14/Rev.2 para. 3 (1947).
29. 4 U.N. ESCOR, 6, U.N. Doc. Supp (No. 3)/259 (1947).
30. E.S.C. Res. 75, 5 U.N. ESCOR 20, U.N. Doc. E/573 (1947).
31. See Article I, paragraph 6 of the Draft Charter of International Human
Rights and Duties submitted by Ecuador to the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/341
(1947).
32. Draft Outline of an InternationalBill of Human Rights (Prepared by the
Division of Human Rights of the Secretariat), reprinted in [1949] Y.B. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 486 (United Nations).
33. Report of the Secretary-General on the Present Situation with Regard to
Communications Concerning Human Rights 165, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/165 (1949).

34.
35.

H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 230 (1950).
UNESCO Dec. 11.3, 29 UNESCO Executive Board 19, UNESCO Doc. 29

EX/Decision (1952).

36. Id.
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disposing of communications than dealing with them. Under
the procedure, the Director-General acknowledged receipt of
the complaint and then forwarded them to the Chairman of
the Board, who examined them "in consultation with the Bureau." The Chairman then submitted to the Board "those
complaints which seem to him to call for some action by the
Organization. ' 37 Presumably, in view of the Board's self-asserted lack of competence in such matters, the only action envisaged was of a general policy nature, and this would be unlikely to provide any relief to the petitioner. Although the
Board subsequently requested the Director-General to study
measures for the establishment of "machinery for appeal to an
international authority in the event of violations of educational and cultural rights,"3 " no action was taken pursuant to
the study.
The impact of the 1953 procedure was negligible. In 1967,
the Board reviewed its position and adopted Decision 8.3,
which was based on the procedure existing at that time under
Economic and Social Council Resolution 728 F.39 In its decision, the Board reiterated that UNESCO is not authorized
under its constitution to take any measures in connection with
complaints concerning human rights and decided that communications concerning education, science, and culture would
be brought to the notice of the Special Committee on Discrimination in Education. The decision, however, included no
terms of reference to guide the approach of the Special Committee. In the years following 1967, the Special Committee
gradually developed its own procedures for the handling of
communications, and these, in time, led to modification of the
Board's own procedures. It is not possible within the confines
of the present article to examine these developments. 0 Suffice
it to note that they generated enough interest to provoke a
major review of the organization's communication procedure,
which led to the adoption of a thoroughly revamped proce37. UNESCO Dec. 11, 30 UNESCO Executive Board 14, UNESCO Doc. 30 EX/
Decision (1953).
38. 37 UNESCO Dec. 6.3, 34 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Dec. 34
EX/Decision (1954).
39. UNESCO Dec. 8.3, 77 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO 77 Doc. EX/
Decision (1967).
40. The procedure under Decision 8.3 and subsequent developments are analyzed in UNESCO Doc. 100 EX/CR.2 (1976) issued as 102 UNESCO Executive
BoardAnnex II, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19 (1977).
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dure in 1978.
THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR BY DECISION

3.3

In essence, implementation of the procedure adopted by
the Executive Board of UNESCO in 1978 consists of three
stages, all of which take place in private meetings, with the
exception of "questions," which are, in general, to be examined in public meetings of the Executive Board and the
General Conference. The stages are: 1) consideration of admissibility by the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations; 2) consideration of the substance, also by the Committee; and, 3) consideration of the Committee's report by the
Executive Board. Before analyzing these stages, consideration
is given to the process by which the procedure was adopted,
the legal basis for UNESCO's competence in the matter, the
human rights to which the procedure is applicable, and who
may use the procedure and against whom.
The Adoption of the Procedure
At its 1976 session the General Conference invited the
Executive Board and the Director-General "to study the procedures which should be followed in the examination of cases
and questions which might be submitted to UNESCO concerning the exercise of human rights in the spheres of its competence, in order to make its action more effective.

41

The

Conference's mandate was thus of a relatively broad nature.
The Director-General subsequently submitted a particularly
thorough study of existing procedures and relevant considerations to the Board.42 Following detailed discussions of .the
study by the Board,' 3 a Working Party was established to further consider the matter." After three meetings in 1977-78,
41. UNESCO Res. 6.113, 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 59, UNESCO Doc. 19 C/
Resolutions (1976). See UNESCO Res. 12.1, 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 84,
UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Resolutions (1976).
42. 102 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19 (1977).
43. An analytical summary of these discussions is contained in 103 UNESCO
Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/18 (1977).
44. 102 UNESCO Executive Board 26, UNESCO 102 EX/Decision (1977). The
Working Party of thirteen members was chaired by the Executive Board's Chairman.
It is worth noting that several recognized experts on human rights participated in the
work of the Party. They included Mr. T. Buergenthal (U.S.) and Mr. V. Kartashkin
(U.S.S.R.).
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the Working Party submitted a draft decision of the Executive Board outlining the procedures which should be followed. 45 The draft was approved by consensus4" by the Board
in Decision 3.3. Thus, the drafting of the procedure was an
exclusively inter-governmental affair, with no formal input
form non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty
International.
The Legal Basis for UNESCO's Competence in the Matter
As already noted, UNESCO's general competence in
human rights matters derives from its constitution and is reinforced by the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Its
competence is, however, qualified by its constitutional prohibition against intervention in "matters which are essentially
within [the] domestic jurisdiction of member states.

4

7

Dis-

putes over the most appropriate method of reconciling international action to protect and promote human rights with the
avoidance of intervention in the internal affairs of states have
long characterized international debates in the human rights
field. During the discussions of the Executive Board on the
adoption of a communications procedure the oft-repeated arguments were again presented. 48 Thus, on the one hand, it was
maintained that the principle of non-intervention cannot be
used to weaken states' human rights obligations under the UN
Charter, and that violations of the human rights of its citizens
cannot remain solely the concern of a state. On the other
hand, it was said that international consideration of human
rights issues was only appropriate in connection with "largescale and flagrant infringements of human rights which constituted a threat to international peace and security and a
'49
crime against humanity.

45. The reports of the Working Party and the draft decision are contained in
103 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/19 (1977) and 104 UNESCO
Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 104 EX/3 (1978).

46. The process of adoption by consensus is significant since it obviates the
need for states' representatives to detail their position on the decision. The advantages of the consensus approach are considered in M'Bow, The Practiceof Consensus
in International Organizations,30 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 893 (1978).
47. UNESCO CONST. art. I, Para. 3.
48. See 103 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/18, paras. 4-12
(1977).
49. 102 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/SR.5, para. 10.5
(1977).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

In the view of one commentator, "it may be argued that
human rights matters cease to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of States to the extent that the States have cooperated, through UNESCO, in drafting international human
rights instruments."50 For present purposes, however, the important questions relate to the legal nature of decisions taken
pursuant to the procedure and to the attitude which states
will adopt in practice towards the procedure. These issues are
considered below.
The Human Rights to Which the Procedure is Applicable
Decision 3.3 relates to those human rights which fall
within UNESCO's competence in the fields of education, science, culture, and information, 1 and which are set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or in one of the International Covenants on Human Rights. No definitive indication of which rights are thus covered has been given. The following rights appear to be covered by the procedure:52
1) The right to education5 including the right of parents and guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
50. Marks, supra note 5, at 40.
51. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 14(a)(iii).
52. The inclusion of the rights listed under paragraphs 1-6 was generally accepted in the travaux preparatoires:see 102 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO
Doc. 102 EX/19, paras. 131-132 (1977). The rights listed under paragraphs 7-9 are
also covered by the procedure, in the view of the Director of UNESCO's Division of
Human Rights and Peace. See Human Rights Committee 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.78 (1978). Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee, it could be argued, has
endorsed by implication an expansive view as to which of the rights contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights fall within UNESCO's field of
competence. The Covenant provides that "the Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports [of State Parties] as may fall within
their field of competence." CCPR, supra note 11, art. 40 para. 3. Although UNESCO
* indicated to the Committee that it considered articles 18 (4), 19, and 27 of the Covenant to be mainly relevant to its field of competence and articles 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 22, 23,
and 24 thereof to be of some concern to it the Secretary-General subsequently proposed to the Committee that only those parts of states' reports relating to articles 18
(4), 19, and 27 be transmitted to UNESCO. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/L.3/Add.1 (1977);
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IV/CRP.3 (1978). Nevertheless, the effect of the decision subsequently taken by the Committee is to let the agencies themselves determine which
rights fall within their competence. See Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/SR.181, para. 14 (1979).
53. Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 26; CESCR, supra note 11, art. 13.
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convictions; 54
2) The right to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits; 55
3) The right freely to participate in the cultural life of
the community;56
4) The right to hold opinions and to freedom of expression including freedom to seek, receive, and impart informa7
tion and ideas of all kinds;
5) The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
8
religion;
6) The right to protection of interests resulting from
59
any ,scientific, literary, or artistic production;
7) The right to freedom of association including the
right to form and join trade unions;60
8) The right of every child, without discrimination, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor;6 '
9) The right of members of minority groups to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion,
or to use their own language. 2
The decision of the Executive Board by which the procedure was adopted does not indicate whether or not the procedure provides personal protection for those through whom
these rights are actualized, such as teachers, scientists, artists,
and journalists, in cases where the right invoked does not otherwise come within UNESCO's competence. This would be
the case, for example, when a communication indicated that a
teacher had been imprisoned or tortured on account of his or
her political activities. This interpretation was suggested dur54.
55.
15(1)(b).
56.
15(1)(a).
57.
58.
18(1).
59.
15(1)(c).
60.
22(1).
61.
62.

CCPR, supra note 11, art. 18(4).
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 27(1); CESCR, supra note 11, art.
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 27(1); CESCR, supra note 11, art.
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 19; CCPR, supra note 11, art. 19.
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 18; CCPR, supra note 11, art.
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 27(2); CESCR, supra note 11, art.
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, art. 20; CCPR, supra note 11, art.
CCPR, Id. note 11, art. 24(1).
Id. art. 27.
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6s but
ing the travaux preparatoires
appears not to have been
viewed with favor by a majority of members of either the Executive Board 64 or its Working Party. 5 Nevertheless, the procedure as adopted would seem to provide considerable scope
for the adoption of an expansive interpretation of the rights
to which it is applicable. Indeed, such an interpretation was
foreshadowed by a member of the Committee on Conventions
and Recommendations in September 1979, when he observed
that "the right to life, implicit in which was the right to peace,
was of major importance for UNESCO."6 6 If the Committee
were to endorse such a view, only a very few human rights
problems would remain outside the scope of the procedure.
Resort to UNESCO would thus be a viable alternative to
seeking relief under comparable UN procedures.
In addition to the rights specified above, the procedure
also applies to "questions of massive, systematic or flagrant
violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms-including, for example, those perpetrated as a result of
policies of aggression, interference in the internal affairs of
States, occupation of foreign territory and implementation of
a policy of colonialism, genocide, apartheid, racialism, or national and social oppression-falling within UNESCO's fields
of competence
. 6 It may be noted that the reference to
a policy of "national and social oppression" constitutes a potentially significant addition to the usual litany of policies
cited in comparable UN resolutions.

Who May Lodge a Complaint with UNESCO?
Anonymous communications are inadmissible.6 Although
the Working Party set up by the Executive Board noted that
"it might be necessary to take account of cases in which the
author of the communication feared that to divulge his name
might be prejudicial to him,"' 9 the procedure makes no provi63. 102 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, paras. 114 &
131(c) (1977).
64. 103 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/18, paras. 13-20
(1977).
65. 103 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/19, paras. 19-21
(1977).
66. 108 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 108 EX/39, para. 9 (1979).
67. Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 18.
68. Id. para. 14(a)(i).
69. 103 UNESCO Executive Board 6, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/19, para. 30
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sion for such exceptions to the rule about anonymity. The
procedure contemplates two main sources of communications:7" 1) a person or group of persons who can be reasonably
presumed to be victims of an alleged violation of any of the
human rights falling within UNESCO's field of competence;
and 2) any person, group of persons or non-governmental organization7 1 having reliable knowledge of those violations.7 2 In
addition, although the procedure itself does not refer to the
right of a Member State of UNESCO to submit a communication it would seem that, insofar as a state constitutes a "group
of persons", a Member State would not be excluded from do73
ing SO.

Against Whom May Complaints be Directed?
The procedure only provides for complaints to be directed against states. 74 As the development of an appropriate
and effective procedure was formally authorized by the
UNESCO General Conference in 1976, the subsequent decision of the Executive Board by which the procedure was established does not need to be ratified by Member States or by
the General Conference. 75 Thus, the method by which the
procedure was brought into being has effectively minimized
the danger of protracted and unduly politicized debate over
(1977).
70.

Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 14(a)(i).

71. It is noteworthy that the procedure does not require non-governmental organizations (NGO) to have consultative status with UNESCO or to have statutory
objectives which include the promotion of human rights, although these conditions
were considered during the travaux preparatoires. See 102 UNESCO Executive

Board 61, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 136 (1977); 103 UNESCO Executive
Board 5-6, UNESCO Doc. 103 EX/19, paras. 22-27 (1977).
72. This requirement is thus less restrictive than its counterpart under the UN
procedure contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (1970). The
rules relating to the latter require "direct" as well as reliable knowledge. See SubComm'n Res. 1, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities 50 at para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070, E/CN.4/Sub.2/323
(1971).
73. A Member State would not be required to demonstrate the existence of any
legitimate interest in so acting since its membership of the organization would be
sufficient justification for its action. 102 UNESCO Executive Board 61, UNESCO

Doc. 102 EX/19, paras. 134-35 (1977).
74. There is no requirement that the author of the communication should occupy any particular relationship, in terms of nationality or jurisdictional residence,
vis-a-vis the state complained against.
75. See Human Rights Committee 9 at para. 37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.78
(1978).
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its details.
One question which remains is whether the procedure
might be used against states which are not members of
UNESCO. Although the procedure does not specifically exclude the consideration of communications relating to such
states, the practice under the previous UNESCO procedure
was to take no action with respect to violations alleged to
have occurred on the territory of a non-Member State.

6

It

seems likely that this practice will be continued under the
new procedure. In any event, since the organization's competence in this area is based on its constitutional mandate, it is
clear that only Member States are obliged to cooperate with
the procedure. For the same reason, ratification by Member
States of either or both of the International Human Rights
Covenants would not appear to be necessary in order to justify the application of the procedure.
Procedures Leading to a Decision on Admissibility
The admissibility of a communication is determined by
the Committee in accordance with the conditions specified in
the procedure. Before a decision is made the Director-General
77
is required to:

(i) acknowledge receipt of communications and inform
the authors of the conditions governing admissibility;
(ii) ascertain that the author has no objection either to
the communication being sent to the government concerned
and then brought to the notice of the Committee or to his
name being divulged. In addition to its procedural significance, this process is also used as a means of verifying the
authenticity of the author's name and address;
(iii) upon receipt of an affirmative answer from the author, transmit the communications to the government concerned, informing it that the communication will be brought
to the notice of the Committee, together with any reply the
government may wish to make; and
(iv) transmit the communication to the Committee, together with the reply, if any, of the government concerned
76.
(1977).
77.

14(b).

102 UNESCO Executive Board 54, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 117
These requirements are contained in UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para.
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and additional relevant information from the author, taking
into account the need to proceed without undue delay."
In order to be deemed admissible, communications must,
in addition to the requirements noted above 7 9 be compatible
with the principles of UNESCO, the UN Charter, and international human rights instruments; not be motivated exclusively by non-human rights related considerations; not be
manifestly ill-founded or devoid of relevant evidence; be
neither offensive nor an abuse of the right to submit communications;80 not be based exclusively on information disseminated through the media; be submitted within a reasonable
time; indicate whether an attempt has been made to exhaust
available domestic remedies;" and not relate to matters already settled according to human rights principles.8 2 The effect on admissibility of the consideration of the same matter
under an alternative international procedure is considered below.8" If any one of the ten specific conditions for admissibility is not satisfied, no action is taken on the communication.
Once the Committee reaches a decision on admissibility, both
78. In order to discourage the use of delaying tactics by governments the Committee is likely to follow the practice, established under the earlier UNESCO procedure, of allowing approximately one month for receipt of a reply from the government
concerned before transmitting the communication to the Committee. 102 UNESCO
Executive Board 55, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 122 (1977).
79.

See note 77 supra.

80. Procedures adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in Res. 1, supra note 72, para. 3(b) indicate that
the notion of abuse includes the use of abusive language, especially in the form of
insulting references to the state concerned. However, under the UNESCO procedure
a communication may be considered if, after the exclusion of the offensive or abusive
parts, it meets all other criteria of admissibility. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1,
para. 14(a)(vi).
81. In theory, other comparable procedures are more restrictive since they require the previous exhaustion of all domestic remedies, rather than only an attempt
to do so. However, in the practical application of the other procedures the stringency
of the rule has been substantially modified. See 102 UNESCO Executive Board 40,
UNESCO 102 EX/19, paras. 76-78 (1977). The UNESCO procedure has been characterized as going "half way" in the direction of applying the traditional judicial rule.
Human Rights Committee 9, para. 39, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.78 (1978). See generally, Trindade, The Domestic Jurisdictionof States in the Practice of the United
Nations and Regional Organizations, 25 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 715 (1976).
82. The procedure does not indicate whether or not matters which have already
been the subject of a prior submission may be submitted on a second or subsequent
occasion. The general practice in such cases is to accept communications which shed
further light of a material nature on any alleged violation which is being or has already been considered.
83. See text accompanying notes 101-24 infra.
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the author and the government concerned are notified by the
84
Director-General.

Considerationof the Substance
Once the Committee has declared a communication to be
admissible, it continues its examination of the matter in private to determine whether further action is warranted. In its
consideration of the merits the Committee has four basic
sources of information available to it. These are: the information provided by the author in support of a communication;
the reply which the government concerned may wish to make;
the information provided by the government's representatives,
who may attend the Committee's meetings in order to provide
additional information to answer questions posed by members
of the Committee;" and any other "relevant information at
' The latter source is of
the disposal of the Director-General."86
particular significance, since it gives the Committee access to
information, provided to UNESCO by the government concerned in connection with matters other than the relevant
communication. The Committee may also use information
contained in reports emanating from other governmental or
non-governmental sources.87 In addition to these four sources,
the Committee is empowered to seek additional information
that "it may consider necessary for the disposition of the matter."88 Finally, the procedure provides that if the Committee
wishes to hear the author of a communication or other relevant persons, it may, "in exceptional circumstances," seek authorization to do so from the Executive Board.89
The net effect of these information provisions is to give
the Committee access to almost every conceivable source of
information of any significance. The provisions thus amount
to a major breakthrough in terms of comparable alternative
procedures, which are invariably more restrictive in relation to
information-gathering procedures.9 0
84. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 14(i).
85. Id. para. 14(e).
86. Id. para. 14(f).
87. Thus, for example, the Committee could, if it wished, take account of reports produced by NGOs such as Amnesty International.
88. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 14(h).
89. Id. para. 14(g).
90. This is exemplified by the practice of the Committee's forerunner, the Corn-
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Although the Committee may keep a communication on
its agenda while seeking additional information," the procedure includes no provision, other than the opportunity afforded to the government concerned to reply to the communication by which any of the parties may obtain access to the
evidence before the Committee. If, following an examination
of the merits, the Committee determines that a communication warrants no further action, the Committee is required to
dismiss the communication and notify the author of the communication and the government concerned accordingly.2 The
author of the communication, as well as the government concerned, are thus informed of the status of the complaint at
each stage of the Committee's deliberations.
Where further action is warranted, the Committee is required to act "with a view to helping to bring about a friendly
solution designed to advance the promotion of human rights
falling within UNESCO's fields of competence." As noted in
the travaux preparatoires,the means available to the Committee for carrying out this mandate are not susceptible of
rigorous definition and would need to be determined in the
light of the circumstances of each particular case.' 4 Among the
possible options are the undertaking of a "good offices" mission by a representative of the Director-General or by one or
more members of a competent organ, such as the Committee.
In accordance with the flexible nature of the friendly settlement sought to be achieved by the procedure, no particular
type of settlement is specified; nor are there criteria by which
to assess the substantive validity of the settlement, other than
consistency with human rights principles.
Considerationof the Committee's Reports
The Committee is required to submit confidential reports
at each session of the Executive Board on the carrying out of
mittee on Conventions and Recommendations in Education, which noted that "its
terms of reference were limited to the examination of the contents of the communication transmitted to it. . .and that it was not incumbent on it to take into consideration or to seek out further information, or to carry out verifications or inquiries." 94
UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. EX/50, para. 14(b) (1974).
91. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 14(h).
92. Id. para. 14(0).
93. Id. para. 14(k).
94. 102 UNESCO Executive Board 64, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 143
(1977).
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its mandate under the present procedure. The Committee has
considerable discretion in determining what information to include in its report; the procedure provides only that the reports "shall contain appropriate information arising from its
examination of the communications which the Committee
considers it useful to bring to the notice of the Executive
Board." s The reports shall also contain recommendations,
which the Committee may make either generally or regarding
the disposition of a communication under consideration.
The confidential reports of the Committee are to be considered by the Executive Board in private session.96 The procedure also provides, however, that the Board may take further action as necessary in accordance with rule 28 of its
Rules of Procedure.7 Under that rule, the Board is empowered to decide whether or not its documents will be made
public. Thus, publication of the reports may or may not be
undertaken at the Board's discretion. The only exception to
this procedure occurs in relation to "questions," which are
considered below.
The only information presently available concerning action taken by the Executive Board pursuant to a report of the
Committee is the bland statement that, at its September-October meeting in 1979, the Board examined the Committee's
report and "took note thereof, requesting the Director-General to give effect to the recommendations contained
therein."" The only implication to be drawn from this statement is that the recommendations as formulated by the Committee proved to be acceptable to the Board. Until such time
as further information is available as to action taken and results achieved under the procedure," it will be impossible to
assess its effectiveness in practice.
95. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 15.
96. Id. para. 16.
97. Id.
98. 108 UNESCO Executive Board 45, UNESCO Doc. 108 EX/Decision, para. 2
(1979).
99. It may be noted in this connection that, as pointed out in the travaux
preparatoires,there is no provision in UNESCO's Constitution which bars the organization from preparing and publishing reports and studies on matters which
fall
within its purview. 102 UNESCO Executive Board 65, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19,
para. 149 (1977). This fact, added to the Committee's power to include in its report
to
the Board whatever information it wishes, could be used at some stage to better
inform the public, through the Board, of the progress achieved through the operation
of
the procedure.
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COORDINATION WITH ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES

In recent years the UN General Assembly has turned its
attention to the growing need for better coordination of the
various human rights programs and activities conducted
throughout the UN system.100 The need for effective coordination has long been noted by the Administrative Committee on
Coordination10 ' and Other bodies. Its importance is dictated
not only by the need to avoid unnecessary duplication, but
also by the need to prevent conflict arising between the various obligations incumbent upon states as members of different international agencies and as parties to various internaof overlapping
avoidance
tional instruments. The
responsibilities also helps to ensure that the interpretation
and supervision of international obligations in the human
rights field is undertaken by the organs most competent in the
particular area concerned. The importance of coordination of
human rights activities has also been recognized by UNESCO,
both in general terms and in connection with the procedure
under consideration here. Thus, a 1978 resolution of the General Conference indicates that one of the aims of UNESCO's
human rights activities should be to "strengthen cooperation
with other organs of the UN system in the implementation of
instruments and procedures concerning the assurance of
human rights."102 More specifically, the 1976 General Conference resolution that led to the establishment of the new procedure called for "close cooperation and coordination with the
"10o
relevant United Nations organs ...
In contrast to most, if not all, other international communications procedures, the UNESCO procedure is silent as to
the effect on admissibility where the subject-matter of a communication is already under consideration in connection with
another international procedure. The issue of coordination
was considered in the travaux preparatoiresbut the outcome
was inconclusive. The Director-General noted that duplication
100. See General Assembly resolution 33/54 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 144,
U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978).

101.

See Annual Report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination

(1973-74), U.N. Doc. E/5488 (1974).
102. UNESCO Res. 3/1, 20 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec., UNESCO Doc. 20 C/
Resolution, para. (c) (1978).
103. UNESCO Res. 12.1, 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec., UNESCO Doc. 19 C/
Resolution, para. 10(c) (1976).
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of effort in connection with human rights "questions" had
been "rare" in the past and "very rare" in connection with
"cases." In any event, be noted, instances where
cases had
been considered under overlapping procedures had "been in
no way prejudicial to the interests of the authors of those
complaints, but in fact quite the reverse. "104
The questions of coordination raised by the silence of the
UNESCO procedure are twofold. First, can the UNESCO procedure apply when precisely the same subject-matter is already being dealt with under another international procedure? The answer would appear to be that there is no specific
provision in the procedure to prevent simultaneous consideration as far as UNESCO is concerned, other than the organization's commitment to "act in a spirit of international cooperation" in human rights matters.'01 Second, does the
consideration of a case by UNESCO either preempt or preclude the application of other procedures? The most significant procedures which might be affected are those provided
for in resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social Council and
those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto.
06
The 1503 Procedure'

The procedures adopted to govern the application of resolution 1503 provided that "communications shall be inadmissible if their admission would prejudice the functions of the
specialized agencies of the United Nations system."'' 0 7 Writing
in 1972, one commentator suggested that this provision required such a broad interpretation as to render inadmissible a
communication submitted under the 1503 procedure concerning a matter that might, at some future time, be referred to
one of the agencies by a state. 0 8 This would mean that communications alleging gross violations of the rights to educa104. 102 UNESCO Executive Board 67, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 159
(1977).
105. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 7.
106. See generally Moller, Petitioning the United Nations Universal Human
Rights 57-72 (1979); Tarda, United Nations Response to Gross Violations of Human
Rights: The 1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559 (1980).
107. Sub-Comm'n Res. 1, supra note 72, para. 4(a).
108. Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to the United Nations on

Human Rights Violations, 5

REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME

375, 384-88 (1972).
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tion, culture, science, and information would all be inadmissible under the 1503 procedure. Likewise, communications
involving the rights to work, to freedom of association, to freedom from forced labor, and to other rights protected under
ILO instruments would be inadmissible. It is submitted that
such an interpretation is unduly broad and is unlikely to have
been adopted in practice in dealing with 1503 complaints.
Otherwise, the Sub-Commission, by adopting the relevant
provision, would have considerably narrowed the scope of the
procedure established by the superior organ, the Economic
and Social Council. It seems, therefore, that the provision is
designed to ensure that the 1053 procedure will not be permitted to stand in the way of the effective exercise of the agencies' procedures once those procedures have been called into
operation. Thus, a determination that a complaint is admissible under the UNESCO procedure should entail the cessation
of any consideration of the identical issue by UN organs
under the 1503 procedure.
In any event, if the Economic and Social Council determines that the UNESCO procedure constitutes the establishment within the United Nations of a new organ entitled to
deal with communications, the Council will then be required
to review the entire 1503 procedure in accordance with the
terms of paragraph 10 thereof.
The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 41 of the Covenant provides that a State Party
may, at any time, recognize the Committee's competence to
receive and consider communications from a State Party
claiming that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. Under article 44, the provisions for
the implementation of the Covenant apply without prejudice
to the procedures prescribed by or under the constituent instruments and the conventions of the UN and the specialized
agencies. The implementation provisions shall not prevent
States Parties to the Covenant from having recourse under
other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with
general or special international agreements in force between
them. The legislative history of article 44 indicates that the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee is not affected
by either the existence or the application of procedures under
other instruments, such as the UNESCO procedure. In fact, a
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provision to the contrary was specifically deleted from the
Covenant during its consideration by the Third Committee of
the General Assembly. 0 9 Thus the question of competition
between the UNESCO procedure and the Covenant's interstate proceedings provisions does not arise.
The Optional Protocol
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights empowers the UN Human Rights
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a State Party's violations of
any of the rights contained in the Covenant. By January 1980,
twenty-two states had ratified the Protocol.
Under article 5 (2)(a) of the Protocol, the Committee cannot consider any "matter" which is "being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement." The Committee has not sought to list all the competing procedures that it considers, for the purposes of article 5
(2)(a), to be procedures of international investigation or settlement. It has, however, been forced to consider specific cases
as they have arisen. As a result, it has determined that the
procedure followed by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights does constitute a procedure of international investigation or settlement, whereas the one contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 does not." 0 The
Committee has also determined that procedures established
by non-governmental organizations cannot prevent it from
considering communications submitted to it under the Optional Protocol."' However, while the Committee has discussed the status of the UNESCO procedure at some length,
it has not yet been forced, by virtue of the problem arising in
a particular case, to adopt a position vis-a-vis that procedure.
At its fourth session, in July 1978, members of the Committee
expressed considerable concern at the failure of the UNESCO
procedure to deal with the question of coordination with other
potentially competing procedures. One member specifically
raised "the possibility of the Committee being prevented from
109. Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) paras. 504-515.
110. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 40)
99-100 para. 582, U.N. Doc. A/33/40 (1978).
111. Id.
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performing its functions, and wondered to what extent the
[UNESCO] procedures could be used or abused to frustrate
the Committee's work."' 1 2 By contrast, other members of the
Committee hinted strongly at the prospect that, when pressed
to decide, the Committee will determine that the UNESCO
procedure does not, at least for the purposes of article 5
(2)(a), constitute a procedure of international investigation or
settlement."' Such a determination would conveniently remove all obstacles from the Committee's consideration of a
communication that was also being examined under the
UNESCO procedure. However, careful consideration of the legal basis for such a determination would appear to reveal certain difficulties.
Before analyzing these difficulties it may be noted that
the lack of coordination between the two procedures gives rise
to a very real problem, for two reasons. First, the procedure
under the Optional Protocol represents the first operational
procedure for examining individual complaints of human
rights violations that is of potentially universal applicability." Prior to the adoption of the Protocol by the General
Assembly the creation of such a procedure was hotly debated,'18 and thus, both its proponents and opponents will
place considerable store on the effectiveness and degree of acceptance achieved by the procedure. Second, the UNESCO
procedure unquestionably offers certain advantages to potential petitioners, including: considerably less onerous requirements as to the standing of the petitioner;"' less stringent re112. Human Rights Committee para. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.78 (1978). The
same member, Mr. Lallah, suggested one form of possible abuse when he posed the
question "what would happen if, when the Committee was considering a case, someone other than the individual who had submitted the communication concerned decided to make use of the UNESCO procedures, without the knowledge of that person?" Id.
113. Id. para. 45; Human Rights Committee 2-3 paras. 7, 9, & 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.82 (1978).
114. Note that article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, provides for an optional procedure for the receipt and consideration of "communications from individuals or groups
of individuals within the jurisdiction of a State Party set forth in [the] Covenant."
However, since the procedure does not enter into force until at least ten states agree
to be bound by it, it is still not operative. As of January 1980, only seven states had
made the appropriate declaration.
115. See generally Schwelb, Civil and PoliticalRights: The InternationalMeasures of Implementation, 62 AM. J. oF INT'L L. 827, 860-68 (1968).
116. Whereas the UNESCO procedure may be used by any individual or group
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quirements as to the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies;
less restrictions on the sources from which information may
be obtained; the possibility of some form of hearing; a potentially broader coverage since it may be used in connection
with many economic, social, and cultural rights as well as
many civil and political rights; and potentially greater flexibility for achieving a conciliatory result. Thus its establishment could have the effect of channeling complaints away
from the Human Rights Committee, thereby undermining the
latter's role as the major complaints settlement procedure
within the UN system. In this regard the UNESCO procedure
is not readily comparable to other procedures which might
preempt the role of the Human Rights Committee, such as
those established by the ILO, since these relate to comparatively well defined, specialized areas of concern. 117 The
UNESCO procedure, by contrast, is potentially applicable
across a very broad spectrum of human rights concerns.
The crux of the issue under consideration is whether or
not the UNESCO procedure constitutes a "procedure of international investigation or settlement." Discussions in the
Human Rights Committee have suggested a number of approaches which could be used in order to argue that it does
not constitute such a procedure.

The procedure is not judicial. In addressing the Commithaving reliable knowledge of violations of relevant human rights the Optional Protocol requires that a communication must be signed either by the alleged victim or by
someone having the authority to act on behalf of the alleged victim. In the practice of
the Human Rights Committee close family connection is considered to be a sufficient
link to justify an author acting on behalf of an alleged victim. However, the Committee has declined to consider communications where the authors have failed to establish any link between themselves and the alleged victim. Report of the Human Rights
Committee, 33 U.N. GAOR, (Supp. No. 40) 99 at pars. 580, U.N. Doc. A/33/40 (1978).
117. An important potential exception in this regard is the communications
procedure provided for in the draft "African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights". The only provision for coordination is the requirement that, in order to be
considered by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, a communication "shall not deal with cases which have been settled by the State involved, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or of the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity and of the provisions of the present convention."
Organization of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.1 (1979), art. 54, para. 6. If
the African Charter, as drafted, is implemented, it will certainly constitute a procedure of international investigation or settlement and thus the Human Rights Committee will be precluded from considering a matter which is being examined by the
African Commission. In view of the potentially greater effectiveness of regional procedures such as an outcome is probably preferred.
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tee, the Director of UNESCO's Division of Human Rights and
Peace stated that "the Working Party of the Executive Board
of UNESCO.

.

.had concluded that since the procedures had

no legal character and since UNESCO's role was not that of
an international judicial body, no reference should be made to
the condition of admissibility as dealt with

. .."

in article 5

(2)(a).118

But the fact that UNESCO's role is not a judicial
one is not dispositive of the issue, since a judicial character is
not an indispensable element of a procedure of international
investigation or settlement.11 9 Indeed, the role of the Human
Rights Committee itself could not strictly be termed judicial.
The procedure applies to areas outside UNESCO's
human rights competence. It could be argued that UNESCO
is only competent to establish a communications procedure
relating to its specific areas of competence and that the procedure, as adopted, employs too expansive an interpretation of
those areas. However, in addition to the fact that the competence to make such an interpretation surely lies with the General Conference of UNESCO rather than with the Human
Rights Committee, the determination of competence would
not appear to be relevant to deciding whether or not the
UNESCO procedure is one of international investigation or
settlement.
The Protocolprocedure takes precedence by virtue of its
greater specificity. A third approach might be to apply the
general principle of law that specific rules take precedence
over general rules. Thus, the Protocol is arguably a specific
procedure for the consideration of individual communications,
whereas the UNESCO procedure is a much broader and more
general one. But again, this distinction is not adequate to justify the finding that the UNESCO procedure is not one of international investigation or settlement. It may constitute a
less effective and more generalized procedure than that under
the Protocol; but it is, nevertheless, such a procedure, and
that is all that counts under article 5 (2)(a).
The procedure is not binding. According to one member
of the Committee, the status of the UNESCO procedures
under article 5 (2)(a) "would depend on whether they were
118.
119.

Human Rights Committee para. 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.78 (1978).
See opinion to this effect of Mr. Opsahl, Human Rights Committee para. 6,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.82 (1978).
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binding on all States members of UNESCO. ' 20 In this respect, the representative of UNESCO informed the Committee that "the answer depended on what was meant by 'binding': whether it was in the sense of a treaty which had been
ratified, or to the extent that a member of an organization, in
1
ratifying its constitution, undertook to respect its decision.'

12

Clearly, the UNESCO procedure can be considered binding
only in the latter and not the former sense. Thus, the
UNESCO procedure is only binding on the organization as a
whole and has not been specifically endorsed by individual
State Members of UNESCO. By contrast, the Optional Protocol is specifically binding as a treaty obligation in international law for those states which have ratified or acceded to it.
But the question remains as to whether a procedure must be
binding in order to constitute a procedure of international investigation or settlement. The case in favor of this proposition
would not appear to be strong.
The presumption of an intent to coordinate. It may be
argued that the call for "close cooperation with the relevant
United Nations organs. .. ,,

which formed part of the 1976

General Conference resolution that provides the authority for
the establishment of the UNESCO procedure, implies that the
scope and status of the procedure should not be interpreted in
such a way as would frustrate the work of the Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Protocol was
adopted by the General Assembly ten years before the
UNESCO General Conference resolution, and it entered into
force two years before the decision of the Executive Board
which established the conditions of admissibility under the
UNESCO procedure. Thus, it could be argued that the presumption of an intention to coordinate the two procedures
would only be rebutted by specific assertion of a contrary intent by the General Conference.
But whatever arguments may be adduced, it is for the
Human Rights Committee itself to determine what status it
will attribute to competing procedures such as the UNESCO
one.123 In some instances, the Committee might determine
120. Human Rights Committee para. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.78 (1978).
121. Id. para. 48.
122. UNESCO Res. 12.1, supra note 103, para. 10(c).
123. This was specifically noted by UNESCO's Program and External Relations
Commission when it considered the question of coordination between the UNESCO
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that the complaint submitted to it is not exactly "the same
matter" as a complaint being considered under another procedure, thereby enabling it to continue its own examination. In
any event, the answer to effective coordination lies not only in
legal formulations but in the spirit in which the procedures
are implemented, with a view to achieving the most effective
possible response to violations of human rights. In this respect, a recent policy statement presented by the Netherlands
government may be noted:
In principle it would be desirable to improve co-ordination between the various international implementation
procedures. On the other hand it is advisable to tread
carefully in this field and to allow the new procedures a
certain amount of time to develop and consolidate themselves in practice. In the long run it may then prove possible to rationalize the various procedures, adapting the
less effective to bring them into line with the better
ones.

124

It should be added that the paramount consideration in such
matters is to ensure that the victims of human rights violations are permitted resort to as wide a range of remedies as
possible.
CONSIDERATION OF "QUESTIONS"
In addition to individual "cases," the procedure adopted
by the Executive Board specifically provides for the consideration of "questions" of "massive, systematic or flagrant violations of human rights which result either from a policy contrary to human rights applied de facto or de jure by a State
or from an accumulation of individual cases forming a consistent pattern. ' 125 Such questions should be considered by the
procedure and that under the Protocol. At the same meeting it was said that there
"was no reason why UNESCO should transmit information to the Human Rights
Committee about the communications examined by the Committee on Conventions
and Recommendations." 107 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 107 EX/34,
para. 40 (1979).
124. THE NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 133 (1979).

125. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 10(b). It may be noted that, in general, a state may bring a human rights matter before the UNESCO authorities by
requesting the inclusion on the agenda of the General Conference of a question concerning respect for human rights in a particular situation. 102 UNESCO Executive
Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, para. 92 (1977).
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Executive Board and the General Conference in public meetings."' No indication of the procedure to be followed by either the Board or the Conference is given. Thus, the procedure is unclear as to whether all questions that come before
the General Conference must necessarily have been previously
considered by the Committee or the Executive Board or both,
although this would appear to be the case. In any event, the
sources of the communication(s) to be brought to the attention of the General Conference would be the same as for any
other communications.127 Those permitted to participate in

the proceedings would be those groups, individuals, and states
permitted to participate in the General Conference pursuant
to the Rules of Procedure. 12 8
Assuming that a question to be considered by the General
Conference would first have to be considered by the Committee or the Executive Board, communications would have been
submitted in time to permit the deliberation of these two bodies and to permit the item to be placed on the agenda of the
Conference in accordance with its rules and procedure. 129 Or-

dinary sessions of the General Conference are held every two
years. There is also provision for the Conference to meet in
extraordinary session if it decides to do so itself, or if it is
summoned by the Executive Board or at the request of at
least one-third of the Member States. 30
The consideration by the General Conference of a question concerning human rights in UNESCO's fields of competence can lead to a decision that is binding on the Organization if not on the state in question.' 8 ' While the procedure
does not specify the types of decisions which might be made
by the Conference, it is clearly implied by the provision for
126. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 18. It may be that the Board will
interpret the word "should" in this paragraph in such a way as to give the Board the
option of referring "questions" to the Conference only "as necessary" rather than in
all instances. See Report of the Director-General, UNESCO Doc. 20 C/14, para. 74
(1978).
127. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 17.
128. See section XIII of the Rules of Procedure of the UNESCO General Con-

ference, reprinted in

MANUEL OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE

(1979).

129. Id. rules 6 and 11-14 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference.
New items of an important and urgent character may be added to the agenda at the
Conference itself by approval of a two-thirds majority of the Members present and
voting (rule 14(2)).
130. UNESCO CONST. art. IV.D.9.(a).
131. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
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questions to be considered in public meetings that publicity is
to be one of the main forms of sanction. More specifically, the
Conference could, for example, request the provision of further information, propose the creation of a fact-finding mission, call upon the state in question to take certain measures
to promote respect for human rights, decide to provide technical or other forms of assistance which might facilitate the termination of any human rights violations, or, as a last resort,
call upon a state to withdraw from membership of UNESCO
in view of the incompatibility of its conduct with the aims and
objectives of the organization.
THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF

UNESCO

A significant feature of the new procedure is its recognition of the important role to be played by the Director-General of UNESCO in seeking to terminate violations of human
rights. It is established diplomatic practice that heads of state
and executive heads of intergovernmental organizations are
entitled to intercede on humanitarian grounds with their
counterparts involved in particular situations. 13 2 Such intercession may be aimed at drawing attention to the plight of
a particular individual or group and is undertaken in a spirit
of mutual respect and confidentiality. It is thus to be distinguished from interference in the internal affairs of states, a
practice that is prohibited under both article 2 (7) of the UN
Charter and article 1(3) of the UNESCO Constitution. The
nature of the humanitarian intercession and the extent to
which a matter is pursued vary according to the circumstances
of each particular case. While it is common knowledge that
the UN Secretary-General uses his "good offices" in efforts to
achieve humanitarian objectives in line with the principles of
the UN Charter,' reference to specific action of this nature is
rarely included in resolutions or other public actions of UN
organs. References are confined to such general statements as
that adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in 1980
requesting "the Secretary-General to continue and intensify
132. See generally 102 UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19,
paras. 28-30 (1977).
133. For example the following statement contained in the Report of the Secre-

tary-General on the Work of the Organization: "I have continued to exert my best
endeavours on behalf of human rights whenever I consider that my actions may be of
assistance to the persons or groups concerned." U.N. Doc. A/34/1 (1979).
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the good offices envisaged in the Charter of the United Na13
' 4
tions in the field of human rights.
Similarly, the Director-General of UNESCO has, from
time to time, been encouraged by both the General Conference 13 5 and the Executive Board13 6 to use his good offices in
the cause of promoting respect for human rights.13 7 The relevant provisions contained in the Executive Board decision by
which it adopted the new communications procedure represent a significant consolidation of the Director-General's
role in respect of intercessions on humanitarian grounds and
representations of a conciliatory nature. The procedure reaffirms the existing practice by recognizing the important role
of the Director- General in "initiating consultations in conditions of mutual respect, confidence, and confidentiality, in order to help reach solutions to particular problems concerning
human rights."'
However, the procedure also extends the
role of the Director-General so that it relates to "questions."
Thus, it recognizes his role in "seeking, continually to
strengthen the action of UNESCO in the promotion of human
rights, both through the settlement of cases and the elimination of massive, systematic or flagrant violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms." 9 In view of the need to
develop a more formidable and flexible array of responses to
situations of human rights violations than has previously existed, the extension of the Director-General's good offices role
under the new procedure is a development of some
significance.
134. Commission on Human Rights Res. (1980) para. 1. See G.A. Res. 34/175
(1979).
135. See UNESCO Res. 11.3, 18 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 85, UNESCO Doc.
18 C/Resolution, para. 3 (1974); UNESCO Res. 12.1, 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 89,
UNESCO 19 C/Resolution, pt. II, preamble (1976); UNESCO Res. 14.1, 19 UNESCO
Gen. Conf. Rec., UNESCO 19 C/Resolution, para. 3 (1976).
136. See UNESCO Dec. 8.2, 93 UNESCO Executive Board 47, 48, UNESCO
Doc. 93 EX/Decision, para. 13 (1973).
137. A recent and much publicized instance of the exercise of the good offices
function of the UNESCO Director-General resulted in the release of an Argentine
pianist Miguel Angel Estrella by the authorities of Uruguay where he had been de-

tained for two years. See U.N.

OBSERVER AND INTERNATIONAL REPORT,

1980, at 4.
138. UNESCO Dec. 3.3, supra note 1, para. 8(b).
139. Id. para. 8(a).
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CONCLUSION

The UNESCO communications procedure has achieved a
delicate and carefully-honed balance in terms of the ideological and other diferences, which in the past have too often obstructed the achievement of progress in the human rights
field. It is perhaps for this reason that the procedure is vague
in a number of important respects and that the achievement
of its full potential will thus depend to a large degree, if not
entirely, on the extent to which the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations and the Executive Board itself
are prepared to take the initiative on behalf of the defense of
human rights. At the same time, the procedure is a fragile
one, since its provisions can be amended at any time by a decision of the Executive Board. The Committee can, therefore,
be expected to tread warily in the first instance to ensure that
the procedure wins the confidence and respect of the states'
members of UNESCO, without whose support it will be of little relevance.
The procedure incorporates a number of important innovations, the effectiveness of which will be carefully watched by
the clients and guardians of comparable international procedures. As noted above, these include: less onerous requirements as to the standing of the petitioner; less stringent requirements as to the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies;
less restrictions on the sources from which information may
be obtained; the possibility of some form of hearing; a potentially broader coverage, since it may be used in connection
with many economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as
many civil and political rights; and a potentially greater flexibility for achieving a conciliatory result. The initial thrust of
the procedure is towards the quiet resolution of human rights
problems through the cooperation of the relevant organs of
UNESCO and the state concerned. Nevertheless, while initially seeking to minimize the opportunities for politicization
of the relevant issues, the procedure acknowledges that, in the
last resort, the pressure of international public opinion,
brought about through the full glare of publicity, may be required in order to achieve the procedure's objectives.
The foregoing has demonstrated the importance of implementing the procedure in a manner which takes full account
of the need to achieve a greater degree of coordination among
international human rights organs than presently exists. Ne-
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vertheless, the absence of specific provisions for coordination
with procedures such as that under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
should not be accorded too great a significance. The resulting
conflict may well be more apparent than real. Thus, it may be
that, apart from providing grist for the academic mill, the potential problems of coordination between the UNESCO procedure and other international procedures will prove not to be
of practical significance from the point of view of petitioners.
Indeed, the interests of the victims of human rights violations
are best served by the availability of a diversity of procedures,
any one of which may be more effective than the others in
terms of providing relief in the circumstances of a particular
case. From that perspective, the UNESCO procedure constitutes a valuable and constructive addition to the ranks of international petition procedures.

